Commentary: Arunachal Pradesh border dispute looms over thaw in China-India ties

The naming of sites in a disputed border region has reignited tensions between China and India but for now, neither country wants an escalation, says former foreign correspondent Nirmal Ghosh.

SINGAPORE: Just as relations between China and India enter a fragile thaw, the longstanding issue of China’s claim on India’s northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh has resurfaced.

New Delhi on Aug 7 formally marked its official map with 27 names of places on or near Arunachal Pradesh’s border with China, which has – since around 2017 and most recently in April – carried out its own naming exercises of places in the state it claims as Chinese territory.

China refers to Arunachal Pradesh as “Zangnan” or southern Tibet because it rejects the 1914 McMahon Line, drawn by the British, as a colonial imposition and hence illegal.

BATTLE OF NARRATIVES

In the eyes of Indian analysts I spoke with, China’s act of naming places in Arunachal Pradesh is seeking to “create facts on the ground” – a phrase that has been applied to China’s actions in disputed areas of the South China Sea.

This is seen by India as needling, thus the move to establish its own more detailed map, with names not necessarily new but which had not figured in the Indian government’s previous official maps.

The latest move signalled that India has upped its own game to establish what some analysts call its own narrative of sovereignty.

This has elicited a reaction, with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Aug 10 calling India’s unilateral move as “illegal, null and void”. A day later, India rejected China’s objection, maintaining that Arunachal Pradesh, which in 1987 became India’s 24th state, is an “inalienable and integral part of India”.

India is inherently at some disadvantage in Arunachal Pradesh. In a planned strategy, China has methodically built up dual civilian-military use infrastructure and created model villages on its side of the border – to demonstrate that life in China is better.

India has been slow to catch up. It has started its own village development programme, and in September 2025 launched a US$4.73 billion, 1,840-km Arunachal Frontier Highway project. It has also beefed up its military strength in the remote eastern Himalayan state marked by thick tropical jungles and high rugged mountains.

But analysts agree that New Delhi must further step up its game across the board in the vulnerable state if it is to adequately match China.

MORE THAN A BORDER DISPUTE

The issue is more than just a border dispute.

Tawang, just some 35km from the border, is home to India's largest Buddhist monastery and was the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama. That makes it a significant place for Tibetan Buddhists - and a religious site that China wants to exercise control over.

The succession of the 14th Dalai Lama, who lives in exile in India, is also a potential flashpoint between China and India.

“The naming of places is part of an increasingly assertive contest over sovereignty, history and cartography,” Nirupama Rao, a former Indian foreign secretary and ambassador, told me.

“The real test lies on the ground. If military restraint is exercised by both sides and working mechanisms to manage the LAC (Line of Actual Control) continue to be deployed, such episodes are containable,” she said.

But Ms Rao also warned of danger in China's “continuing propensity to probe, patrol, build infrastructure and incrementally create facts on the ground”.

“When symbolic assertion of a claim is accompanied by a material attempt to alter the status quo, the larger bilateral relationship comes under serious strain,” she added.

NEITHER SIDE WANTS AN ESCALATION

While it will remain a chronic irritant, the Arunachal Pradesh issue is unlikely to derail the calibrated thaw in ties, which had plunged after a bloody clash in the summer of 2020 at Galwan on the northern Himalayan border.

The thaw in ties is in some ways more tactical than strategic. Both countries see more benefits in cooperating, particularly in the context of the energy shock from the US-Israel war on Iran.

India’s infrastructure and manufacturing ambitions need Chinese inputs, including rare earth magnets, fertiliser and tunnel boring machines. For China, India is also a big market. Bilateral trade topped US$150 billion in 2025, with more than US$100 billion being Chinese exports to India.

Even China's Communist Party-owned media China Daily was somewhat conciliatory in an Aug 11 editorial, saying “China and India have immense common interests” and had already demonstrated that differences over the boundary need not prevent broader engagement.

India is due to host a meeting of BRICS leaders on Sep 12 to Sep 13. The grouping originally comprised Brazil, Russia, India and China, but later expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates.

There was, as of Wednesday (Aug 19), no official confirmation that Chinese President Xi Jinping would attend. If he does not, it would not necessarily be unusual - he skipped last year’s summit in Rio de Janeiro. It is also worth noting that Mr Xi is set to visit the United States – for the first time in 11 years – and meet with President Donald Trump on Sep 24.

But if he does attend the BRICS summit, Mr Xi’s visit would be keenly watched for signs that India and China are willing to manage frictions in the larger interest of both countries.

Nirmal Ghosh, a former foreign correspondent, is an author and independent writer based in Singapore. He writes a monthly column for CNA, published every third Friday.