Like Sisyphus pushing his boulder uphill, Donald Trump keeps rebuilding his tariff wall despite repeated court setbacks. With this third round of tariffs, the U.S. president has erected an amorphous, chaotic barrier riddled with inconsistencies.

On Thursday, the United States approved a new trade framework imposing tariffs of between 10% and 12.5% on imports from more than 60 economies, arguing that those countries have failed to comply with rules concerning the importation of goods made with forced labor. The new duties took effect at 12:01 a.m. on Friday, according to the executive order signed by Trump on Thursday.

Enacted under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the measure is intended to keep the administration’s tariff regime in place, as the previous universal 10% tariff adopted in January was set to expire on Friday. That levy had itself replaced the so-called reciprocal tariffs unveiled during Trump’s first trade offensive on the self-proclaimed “Liberation Day” of April 2, 2025, which were later struck down by the Supreme Court.

Designed to withstand court challenges

The White House’s main goal with this latest trade strategy is to withstand future legal challenges, as happened with the previous two rounds of tariffs. The new framework therefore does more than reshape U.S. trade policy; it also overhauls the legal architecture behind it in an effort to shield it from court challenges.

The executive order signed by President Trump on Thursday says that it is based on 60 separate investigations, is packed with legal caveats and detailed justifications for the measures, and repeatedly stresses that if a court strikes down one provision, the remainder will stay in force.

The administration’s emphasis on those safeguards is no coincidence. It has suffered a series of legal setbacks. The Supreme Court ruled that Trump’s first attempt to impose reciprocal tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), legislation intended for different circumstances, was unlawful. The Supreme Court also reminded the president that he cannot bypass Congress’s authority in imposing such measures.

Months later, the U.S. Court of International Trade also struck down the universal 10% tariff that Trump had introduced to replace the duties invalidated by the Supreme Court, although it allowed the measure to remain in effect while appeals were pending.

Now the administration has worked to build a legal framework designed to better withstand judicial scrutiny. To do so, it has relied on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which authorizes the president to impose tariffs on countries engaged in practices deemed “unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory.”

Complex, chaotic system

But the scheme the Trump administration has designed is complex and chaotic. Trump’s executive order is accompanied by a 55-page annex laying out a web of tariff rules, product- and sector-specific exemptions, special regimes and country-by-country treatment.

The order also grants the administration broad discretion to carve out additional exceptions for “products that could cause economy-wide disruptions if subject to the proposed additional tariffs” and “products that cannot be grown or produced in sufficient quantities or at reasonable prices in the United States.”

In practice, the new tariff regime affects 91 countries if EU member states are counted individually. It establishes tailored arrangements for trading partners that have already reached agreements with Washington, including the European Union, Japan, South Korea and Switzerland. It also exempts a range of products, among them semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, steel, aluminum, automobiles, civil aircraft and informational materials.

The executive order makes no explicit reference to the trade deal reached between the United States and the European Union last summer in Turnberry, Scotland, which set a 15% tariff rate that was then seen as preferential. Under the new framework, however, that rate could leave the bloc at a disadvantage compared with countries facing only a 10% duty.

The legal text does, however, specify that imports from the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan will be net of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) duties, the tariff system designed to guarantee non-discrimination among trading partners by requiring that any preferential treatment granted to one country be extended to all others.

As a result, the EU is expected to see tariff increases only on products currently subject to duties below 10%. That calculation could change, however. Trump has already threatened tariffs of up to 100% on countries that adopt digital services taxes — the so-called Google tax — which targets U.S. technology companies.

Forced labor

There is a certain irony in the fact that the United States is imposing tariffs on the European Union, one of the world’s most advanced jurisdictions on labor rights, as well as on 64 other economies for failing to comply with rules governing imports linked to forced labor. In reality, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), which conducted the investigations underpinning the tariffs, argues that these economies have either failed to ban or failed to effectively enforce restrictions on the import of goods produced in regions where forced labor is used, thereby harming U.S. companies.

In other words, Washington’s argument is not that the EU lacks rules against forced labor, but that it does not enforce them adequately. The executive order does not specify what qualifies as forced labor in this context, nor does it identify the countries where such practices are allegedly taking place. It also does not disclose the findings that led the administration to conclude that Brussels is failing to police those imports effectively.

The USTR says the tariffs are intended to eliminate the “actionable acts, policies, and practices” identified in each of its Section 301 investigations. It notes that some economies subject to the baseline 10% tariff “impose a forced labor import prohibition but do not yet effectively enforce it (Canada, Ecuador, the European Union, Indonesia, Mexico and Pakistan).”

Other countries (Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Malaysia and Taiwan) have pledged to adopt legislation prohibiting such imports. A separate category includes countries with only partial or inadequate regimes (the United Kingdom), while another group consists of economies that have no relevant regulations at all.

The executive order states that “the Trade Representative proposed to establish a textile mechanism that would allow a certain volume of apparel and textile imports to enter the United States at a zero section 301 tariff rate” — a measure that appears aimed at favoring China.

This third round of tariffs also seems far removed from Trump’s original goal of correcting trade imbalances. Instead, it rests on a more indirect rationale, one that, despite the administration’s efforts to insulate it from legal challenges, is likely to end up back in court as affected U.S. companies seek to contest the measures.