An age-old question: why do countries start wars? More importantly, why do contemporary leaders still start wars, or some versions of “special military operations”? Today, the world faces at least two major international military conflicts: the Russia-Ukraine war and the war involving the United States, Israel and Iran. The Russia-Ukraine War has now lasted for more than four years, inflicting significant human casualties and socioeconomic losses on both sides. The war in the Middle East has also destabilized the region and placed a severe strain on global energy markets.
Among multiple explanations for the start of a war, the one that deserves serious scrutiny is the countries’ confidence in a quick military victory. Leaders may be influenced either by an overestimation of their own country’s military capabilities or by an underestimation of those of their adversary. As a result, they may conclude that a swift military victory would be more advantageous than prolonged diplomatic negotiations.
Both World War I and World War II resulted, in part, from such optimistic — and ultimately disastrous — miscalculations by the great powers. The 1950-53 Korean War was likewise initiated by North Korea’s overconfidence that the rapid capture of Seoul would lead to Korea’s reunification. In the 21st century, U.S. expectations of quick victories in Afghanistan and Iraq were shattered by two decades of a prolonged “War on Terror.”
Even after the illusion of a quick military victory has dissipated, countries often find it difficult to end a war. First, the sunk costs of war, including military casualties, motivate governments to secure substantive gains before agreeing to a peace settlement. Second, distrust and enmity between the adversarial countries create challenges in negotiating peace. The fear that an undefeated adversary might exploit a peace settlement motivates countries to continue fighting for a more decisive military outcome.
Tragically, these calculations have contributed to the current attrition in Europe and the Middle East. Having suffered over a million casualties, Russia refuses to end its war until it can at least achieve complete territorial control over Ukraine’s Donbas region. Russia is also fearful of a settlement that would result in Ukraine’s increased political and military alignment with NATO. The U.S. Trump administration and Israel’s Netanyahu government, having justified their military operations as necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, are reluctant to accept an outcome that would allow Iran to retain its potential nuclear development capabilities. As demonstrated by the collapse of their short-lived ceasefire, neither Iran nor the United States and Israel are trustful of the other’s commitment to peace settlement. Eventually, the two wars may end, but perhaps only after all sides in the conflicts experience unbearable costs.
A puzzle remains as to why some contemporary leaders cling to the narrative of a quick military victory. I argue that excessive optimism about advances in military technology may contribute to the danger of renewed military conflicts. While vowing not to repeat the destruction of past wars, contemporary leaders may convince themselves that their own wars will be different. Using sophisticated military technologies, the adversarial regimes’ leadership can be eliminated quickly. The “shock and awe” from technological superiority would demoralize adversarial country’s citizens and soldiers to submission. Military and civilian casualties would be minimal because of the reliance on unmanned drones and precision-guided weapons. The paradox, however, is that while technological advancement reduces the initial cost of starting a war, it increases the risk that countries become entangled in a prolonged military conflict.
Of course, wars may start even when countries do not predict quick victory. Historical grievances, incompatible strategic objectives or cynical calculations of political benefits from an external conflict may motivate leaders to accept the consequences of a prolonged war. However, the promise of a short military conflict offers an alluring solution to contemporary governments facing the Gordian knots of complex geopolitical disputes. Why carefully untangle each knot when they can all be cut with a quick slash of the sword?
Multiple solutions have been proposed to prevent war. One common solution is the enforcement of an international norm that condemns the use of military force as a “taboo.” Another solution is to facilitate creative, integrative bargaining strategies to find diplomatic solutions. The prevention of war, however, also requires a stark warning about its risks: once a war begins, it will not be easy to end. A slash of the sword may not cut the knots but may instead entangle the sword as well. Contemporary Russia and the United States may have pursued different strategies if they had anticipated that their military operations could result in a quagmire with no easy exit.
In Northeast Asia, where concerns are rising over geopolitical conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, preventing military conflict requires diplomatic engagement. But it also requires clear signaling of robust mutual military deterrence. Neither China nor the United States, and neither North nor South Korea, should be misled into assuming that there may be a quick military solution to their disputes. Each country’s military will likely prepare strategies for a quick victory in the event of war. Political leaders, however, should receive explicit warnings that approving a military operation carries a responsibility of risking attrition.
This month marks the 73rd anniversary of the Korean Armistice Agreement. A war that began with the expectation of a quick victory continues without a permanent settlement. Although some wars may become unavoidable, world leaders should not euphemize or downplay their duration and costs. Furthermore, leaders should be reminded that the optimal time to stop a war is before it begins. That is the enduring lesson from the Korean War and from today’s wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Lee Jong-eun (Jong.Lee@ngu.edu) is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University. Prior to this, he served as a Republic of Korea Air Force intelligence officer.