More units: a panacea or a can of worms?

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Experiment. Experience. Fail. Rename. Repeat. This has been the recurring tale of the country since its inception. Every panacea tried proved to be a Pandora's box. The country has experienced totalitarianism, one-unit systems, coups, hybrid regimes, and now, authoritarian democracy - not because these systems promised inclusive prosperity, but because true democracy does. Therefore, the people have always backed the wrong horse. All this has rarely been without design. The power elite always artfully present the malady as a remedy, exonerate themselves of their wrongdoings, and strengthen their stakes. Predictably enough, the incumbent regime has made a diagnosis that goes beyond the real ailments.

Mohsin Naqvi's assertion of the system's collapse might have invoked hope; however, it is worrying for two reasons. First, the system is not collapsing yet. Second, the suggested remedy - more units - is actually a malignant disease. To him, both the system and governance have collapsed, and the way forward lies in creating more units. The ISPR has voiced the need to deliberate on this.

One might wonder if the quagmire engulfing the country stems solely from a lack of administrative units, or if the true failure lies in never genuinely implementing essential pillars of governance - the constitution, democracy, transparency, accountability, the separation of powers, freedom of expression, free elections, education, equitable resources, and political harmony. Having exhausted all brute-force options, the ruling class is now floating a new experiment: creating more units to salvage its collapsing interests.

For decades, the architects and abettors have sustained this system via coercion, false narratives, and the backing of political dynasties, courtier clergy, intelligentsia, a passive judiciary, and a courted media. They did so only after largely stripping it of the public's say, merit, transparency, accountability, and the very vitals of democracy. Now that their democratic mantras, strategic narratives, and sentimental exploitations no longer work, their ill-gotten gains are completely at stake. The ruling elite knows new administrative units will not solve the crisis; they are merely a desperate shield for their self-preservation.

One believes the system is far from collapsed as yet. Instead, it is in the grip of withdrawal symptoms. These symptoms are manifested, among other things, in the heightened administrative and security measures to maintain public order. Furthermore, the rising tide of terrorism in Balochistan and K-P, the chaos in AJK, and the rights movement in Sindh - including the outcry against the SPSC - suggest the system is feeling the heat. Moreover, a capitulated judiciary, accelerating capital flight, institutions devoid of public trust, growing poverty, lawlessness, the Middle East imbroglio, and the immediate need for hard choices add to the worries. Yet, ultimate collapse is perhaps a step ahead.

The discourse surrounding institutional collapse often carries specific structural objectives. Primarily, it helps stabilise public reactions during times of crisis. Additionally, it can divert attention from ongoing security and economic difficulties in provinces like Balochistan and K-P. Finally, it creates a justification for administrative restructuring through new territorial units. In practice, however, creating more units often results in bureaucratic expansion and increased state monitoring, rather than genuine grassroots empowerment. A more direct path to improving governance would be the structural strengthening of local bodies.

The proposed new units would add to administrative costs; threaten cultural and ethnic identities, harmony and fragile integration; fuel resistance among the existing units; and ultimately add to instability that would have lasting effects on the country.

The country has seen all but true democracy. Shouldn't democracy be given a chance?