Since U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House, speculation has repeatedly surfaced about a future meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Much of this has been driven more by the desire to restart nuclear talks than by any substantive indication that a meeting is imminent. Despite the lack of substance to much of this speculation, there are reasons why Kim should pursue a meeting with Trump.

From Pyongyang’s perspective, time seems to be on its side. Since the pandemic, North Korea has gained confidence in its ability to navigate the international environment without engaging the United States. Its self‑imposed border closures demonstrated that the regime could survive, at least temporarily, under the harshest sanctions. Russia’s war against Ukraine then opened unprecedented opportunities for Pyongyang to earn revenue, acquire technology and weaken the broader sanctions regime.

Geopolitical shifts have also moved in North Korea’s favor. With the United States and China increasingly moving from competitive across a wide range of issues to a rivalry, Beijing has less incentive to cooperate with Washington to bring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table.

As a result, talks with the United States are no longer the key to ensuring regime stability in North Korea. Instead, an increasingly close partnership with Russia and improving relations with China provide the regime with the financial lifeline and political cover it needs internationally. Additionally, under the current dynamics there is a strong incentive for Pyongyang to work with Moscow and Beijing to further hollow out the international sanction’s regime.

This context helps explain why Kim did not accept Trump’s offer to meet last year when South Korea hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. The summit was an unappealing venue for U.S.-North Korea talks. Kim would have only been a secondary focus. The trade deals Trump was expected to conclude with Beijing and Seoul, along with the APEC summit itself, where what the international media would focus on. In the absence of a real agreement, any meeting would have only been a footnote to broader events.

Despite the limited incentives for Kim to meet with Trump, he should. The last round of talks during Trump’s first term did not go well, but Trump is a unique figure in U.S. politics. He may not have been able to accept the deal that Kim put on the table in Hanoi, but he is more open to an unconventional approach than more traditional U.S. politicians.

A successor will not be as accommodating. Whether the next president is U.S. Vice President JD Vance, State Secretary Marco Rubio or one of a number of Democrats expected to run in 2028, they will either take a harder line on North Korea than Trump or deprioritize the issue. A deal with Trump may not be what Kim hoped for in 2019, but it this may be his best chance to reshape relations with the United States.

Any agreement with Trump also has a much better chance of sticking than an agreement negotiated with a future president. Trump will continue to carry political influence after he leaves office. While he has been willing to tear up deals, more traditional U.S. presidents have been less willing to do so. Any Republican successor would face strong political pressure to protect Trump’s legacy as long as North Korea was keeping to the agreement.

A Democratic successor would have little incentive to abrogate a deal. Not only would ending a deal simply because Trump negotiated it be a poor use of political capital, but a Democratic administration will also prioritize more pressing domestic concerns and the need to repair U.S. alliances.

All of this means that we are at a unique moment for North Korea to engage the United States. In the past, Pyongyang might have waited to see the results of the midterm elections before committing to a course. That would also be a misreading of the current U.S. environment.

If Kim is to meet Trump, however, North Korea will need to learn from the last attempt to negotiate with the U.S. leader. That means developing clear and obtainable policy objectives that Pyongyang hopes to achieve, what the United States could realistically provide and taking a realistic approach to the issues that must be resolved in advance of a summit and those that truly can only be resolved between Trump and Kim. The Hanoi summit failed because North Korea did not do the necessary policy planning in advance. Avoiding a second failure will require it.

If Kim wants to reshape North Korea’s relationship with the United States, the time is now. He may be right that in the medium-term, relations with Russia and China matter more, but geopolitics can change for unforeseen reasons. He will also never have a more willing partner than Trump. The only question is whether North Korea is willing to explore the opportunity in front of it.

Troy Stangarone is a visiting senior fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.